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Since the mid-1990s, the aim of keeping climate change within 2 8C has become firmly entrenched in policy discourses. In the
past few years, the likelihood of achieving it has been increasingly called into question. The debate around what to do with a
target that seems less and less achievable is, however, only just beginning. As the UN commences a two-year review of the 2 8C
target, this article moves beyond the somewhat binary debates about whether or not it should or will be met, in order to analyse
more fully some of the alternative options that have been identified but not fully explored in the existing literature. For the first time,
uncertainties, risks, and opportunities associated with four such options are identified and synthesized from the literature. The
analysis finds that the significant risks and uncertainties associated with some options may encourage decision makers to
recommit to the 2 8C target as the least unattractive course of action.
Keywords: adaptation policy; climate policy; global warming; governance; mitigation policy; post-2012 negotiations; risk
governance; two degrees; UNFCCC
1. Introduction
The target to limit average global temperature rise to within 2 8C (above pre-industrial levels) is now
firmly entrenched in the policy discourse and, since the 2009 United Nations Framework Convention
onClimate Change (UNFCCC)Conference of the Parties (COP) inCopenhagen, the international legal
regime associated with climate change. Adopted as the threshold beyond which impacts from climate
change are held to be ‘dangerous’, it has been used to justify short- to medium-term targets (i.e. 2020–
2050) for mitigation and, increasingly, informs policy making on adaptation. For the EU (Rayner &
Jordan, 2013), the small island states, the Least Developed Country group, as well as many advocacy
organizations, it has a near totemic status. To question this target (other than by calling for it to be
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tightened, for example to 1.5 8C; see, e.g. AOSIS, 2012) is to challenge the whole rationale for collec-
tively addressing climate change. Others take a slightly more relaxed view, seeing it either as a ‘focal
point’ (Jaeger & Jaeger, 2011) that guides but does not precisely determine international negotiations,
or a ‘boundary object’ between the scientific and political realms (Randalls, 2010). For some critics,
however, the setting of a global temperature target that the world should meet represents an exercise
in hubris of questionable efficacy and legitimacy (Hulme, 2012), ‘a stale variable which offers an illu-
sion of control and a facade of simplicity’ (Mahoney, 2013).
The target’s position in international debates has evolved over the last two decades (Liverman,
2009). Initially, it was suggested in the mid-1990s as a way of adding substance to the UNFCCC’s
commitment in Article 2 to the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.
Around this time, staying within two degrees appeared challenging but eminently achievable, cer-
tainly by the EU, which strongly promoted it within and outside Europe (Jordan, Huitema,
Rayner, van Asselt, & Berkhout, 2010; Rayner & Jordan, 2013). In the lead up to the Copenhagen
COP to the UNFCCC, the EU managed to secure recognition of the target by the G8 (G8, 2009).
In the 2010 Cancu´n Agreements, it was adopted for the first time by a COP: ‘deep cuts in global
greenhouse gas emissions are required according to the science, [. . .] so as to hold the increase in
global average temperature below 2 8C above pre-industrial levels.’1 However, by the time of the
Durban COP in 2011, world leaders were noting ‘with grave concern’ the ‘significant gap’ between
current pledges and emissions pathways consistent with the target (UNFCCC, 2011). The ‘Durban
Platform’ duly sought to reinvigorate international negotiations on legally binding targets to limit
warming to 2 8C.
Despite these recent advances in its policy reach and formal legal status, the target has never been
more politically sensitive than it is now. This slightly paradoxical state of affairs was confirmed in
August 2012 when the US envoy on climate change, Todd Stern, was reported as having called for its
removal from international climate talks (Black, 2012). His remarks drew a fierce reaction. Tony de
Brum, Minister of Assistance to the President of the Marshall Islands, claimed that ‘[s]uddenly aban-
doning our agreement to keep global warming below 2 8C is to give up the fight against climate
change before it even begins’ (quoted in Black, 2012).
In fairness, most of Todd Stern’s comments were devoted to restating his country’s well-known pre-
ference for a ‘pledge and review’ approach to international policy. Nevertheless, the exchange empha-
sized that two important changes since themid-1990s are increasingly salient to decisionmakers. First,
more recent research on mitigation indicates that the increasing growth in CO2 emissions that has
occurred since 2000 (Peters et al., 2013) has significantly reduced the probability of limiting
warming to 2 8C (see Figure 1). Indeed, the chances are likely to diminish further as certain Annex I
countries move out of recession (Meinshausen et al., 2009; UNEP, 2010). In 2011, Fatih Birol, Chief
Economist of the International Energy Agency, and Lord Nicholas Stern argued that without prompt
remedial action, there is a significant risk that the target would be pushed out of reach altogether:
‘[for] the moment our climate goals remain attainable, but the door is closing’ (Birol & Stern, 2011).
Others, including a former Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), have
suggested that the door has effectively already closed (Ghosh, 2012); i.e. the ‘emissions gap’ (UNEP,
2012) can no longer be made up. By exploring when as opposed to if the temperature increase will
exceed 2 8C, others are implicitly endorsing this view (Joshi, Hawkins, Sutton, Lowe, & Frame,
752 Jordan et al.
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2011). Second, a substantial and diverse body of research on impacts and adaptation indicates that
many ecosystems are more sensitive to impacts at 2 8C of warming than was previously thought
(Smith et al., 2009;Warren et al., 2013), andmany risksmay amplify one another to produce cascading
impacts that run through ecosystems and on into social systems (Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013).
Recent political discussions on the 2 8C target reconfirm that climate policy makers are in effect
caught on the horns of a dilemma. Thus, to even mention temperatures greater than 2 8C, let alone
that the target should be dropped given the increasing probability that it will be breached, could be
perceived as a pernicious, self-fulfilling prophecy – a point recognized by experts (IEA, 2013), lay
publics (Capstick, 2012), and of course politicians like Tony de Brum. Yet, by avoiding the matter, by
2020 the international regime could have become the victim of ‘self-inflicted irrelevance’ (Geden,
2012, p. 20), i.e. a situation in which 2 8C remains the cornerstone of policy, but is widely perceived
Figure 1 A comparison between the evolution of climate change policy related to the 2 8C target and global CO2 emissions from
fossil-fuel combustion and cement production.
Notes: These emissions are the largest and fastest-growing contributors to human-induced climate change. The Representative
Concentration Pathways (RCPs) are the four scenarios to be used in the upcoming assessment report of the IPCC to project cli-
mate change to 2100 (Moss et al., 2010). Historical data are from Boden, Marland, and Andres (2011). Temperature projections
are from Rogelj, Meinshausen, and Knutti (2012). The figure is adapted from Peters et al. (2013).
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to be effectively unattainable. Any associated loss of credibility could, some claim, seriously reduce
what momentum remains in international decarbonization efforts (Geden, 2012, 2013).
The decreasing probability of staying within 2 8C, coupled with deepening concern about the shape
and efficacy of future climate policy (Davis, Cao, Caldeira, & Hoffert, 2013), should encourage those
concerned about climate change to take theuncomfortable step of going beyond current and sometimes
rather binary debates about if and/or precisely when the world will cross such a threshold (Guivarch &
Hallegatte, 2013; New, Liverman, Schroeder, & Anderson, 2011; Vieweg et al., 2012), to explore amuch
wider set alternative options than just 1.5 8C or 2 8C. One analyst suggests that rising emissions will
eventually force a target modification of some kind, involving either reinterpretation (whereby, for
example, a temporary crossing of the threshold is permitted or the probabilities of exceeding 2 8C
are made more explicit) or, more radically, revision (either accepting a less ambitious temperature
target or giving up a specific global temperature stabilization target altogether) (Geden, 2013). The
opportunities and risks associated with these options (especially for the role of scientific advice in
policy making) are outlined, but remain sketchy and no particular alternative is recommended. Like-
wise, although other commentators have implicitly conceded the need to explore alternative options
(Guivarch & Hallegatte, 2013, p. 187), these nonetheless remain terra incognita. The debate therefore
seems to have stalled.
However uncomfortable it may be to explore deeply the implications of allowing temperatures to go
beyond 2 8C (Knopf, Kowarsch, Flachsland, & Edenhofer, 2012) and/or to debate alternative options, it
is argued here that identifying alternative options could offer policy makers a way to grapple with the
deepdilemma at theheart of climate policy.Crucially, it neednot necessarily serve as a pretext for aban-
doning the commitment to remainwithin 2 8C. The international communitynowhas a formal oppor-
tunity to debate these important issues. In response to demands from the most vulnerable states, the
Copenhagen COP in 2009 committed itself to review, by 2015, ‘the long term goal referencing various
matters presented by the science, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius’
(UNFCCC, 2009, para. 12), as well as progress made towards it. On the basis of subsequent decisions
made at Doha in 2010, this review began in 2013 (UNFCCC, 2010, para. 139(b)).
At the time of this writing, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and
the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) have jointly established a contact group to assist theCOP
in conducting the review. A structured expert dialogue to support the work of the joint contact group
has been set up to enable an exchange of views, information and ideas and to ensure scientific integrity.
At the firstworkshop, held on5 June 2013, some scientists presented their latest research.2 The review is
to be ‘guided by the principles of equity, and commonbut differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities’ (UNFCCC, 2010, para. 139(a)), wording that suggests that major emitting developing
countries may be wary of the implications for their own mitigation commitments.
The UNFCCC review does seem to be a rather tightly drawn exercise at the moment, but it is argued
here that it could, and indeed should, lead to amuchmore open debate on the 2 8C target and some of
its potential alternatives.While the existing literature points to a number of alternative options, in this
paper we select four of them and explore what theymight entail in practice. Their underlying assump-
tions are summarized, especially in relation to issues of policy and governance, which have tended to
be skirted over inmany of the debates about the 2 8C target. The opportunities and risks of each option
are then explored for particular actors and institutions, aswell as for collective efforts to address climate
754 Jordan et al.
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change. Finally, the main arguments are summarized and their implications discussed for both future
policy and research.
2. What are the options?
There is a range of alternative options around which climate governance (broadly understood tomean
institutional and policy mechanisms to steer society) (Jordan, 2008) could be organized (Aldy, Barrett,
& Stavins, 2003). Although many options could be analysed, four are selected as especially worthy of
initial exploration. For the sake of argument (and to keep to a manageable number), we have deliber-
ately selected themost different, leaving out incremental alterations (e.g. loosening the existing target
to 2.5 8Cor 3 8C). This section briefly outlines them, beginningwith the three that differ most in theway
in which 2 8C is currently framed in policy discourse – i.e. as a target that should be met.
. Option 1: ‘mitigate for 2 8C but adapt for 4 8C’. Even pursuing 2 8C to themaximum does not reduce the
risk of 4 8C to zero. Society should therefore ‘hedge its bets’ by taking steps to adapt to amuchwarmer
world while maintaining a high level of ambition regarding mitigation.
This optionwas popularized (but not coined) by former IPCC chair Sir RobertWatson, (Randerson,
2008) and more fully elaborated at a 2009 conference (New, Liverman, & Anderson, 2009).3 Mabey,
Gulledge, Finel, and Silverthorne (2011) subsequently suggested that such an approach, which they
dub ABC, could have three elements: Aim to stay below 2 8C; Build and budget assuming 3–4 8C;
Contingency plan for 5–7 8C of warming. Although its advocates acknowledge the potential contra-
dictions within the position, these are considered manageable. Given the continuing uncertainties
over climate sensitivity, the eventual magnitude of climate change, and societal capacities to adapt,
policy makers should step up their current efforts to mitigate. For their part, adaptation policy
makers may not have to do too much differently, particularly given the difficulty of drawing a
neat distinction between the actions they will need to take for a 2 8C world in 2050 and what
might be required for 4 8C (although a more ‘transformative’ kind of adaptation might be necessary
in some cases; Stafford Smith, Horrocks, Harvey, & Hamilton, 2011).
. Option 2: ‘adopt new metrics and targets’. Because a long-term temperature-based target appears unable
to stimulate short-term policy responses and in any case does not represent current understandings
of global climate system sensitivities, more specific and near-term targets should be adopted.
Here, Lenton’s (2011a) views are taken as representative of a much larger and emerging line of
thought on planetary boundaries (Rockstrom et al., 2009). Lenton (2011a) suggests that a range of
potential thresholds of danger exist, not necessarily linked to global mean temperature change,
but instead to (1) magnitudes of change, (2) rates of change, and (3) spatial gradients of anthropo-
genic radiative forcing. For example, monsoons could potentially be disrupted by localized
warming altering local temperature gradients, which in turn are influenced by the uneven distri-
bution of anthropogenic aerosols such as black carbon in the atmosphere. Future policy efforts
could therefore be tailored to respond to these thresholds, rather than the ‘meta’ target of 2 8C of
warming. Article 2 of the UNFCCC (noted above) could even be revised to make limiting anthropo-
genic radiative forcing the principal objective, with the stabilization of GHG concentrations as one
of a number of sub-objectives. The scientific literature is already beginning to frame scenarios in
Going beyond 2 8C? 755
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terms of radiative forcing (Moss et al., 2010). Themain aimwould be to prevent the crossing of large-
scale thresholds in physical systems, but it could also help to address some of the other ‘reasons for
concern’ highlighted by the IPCC (Smith et al., 2009).
. Option 3: ‘be politically more pragmatic’. Society should accept that adopting science-informed targets
such as 2 8Chas failed to drive social change and governors should instead concentrate on delivering
what is politically achievable in the short to medium term.
This option emerges from a discourse that has, since the early 1990s, repeatedly expressed scepti-
cism towards the ‘hyperbolic multilateralism’ of UN climate policy (Prins et al., 2010, p. 7). Propo-
nents argue that not only has this failed to achieve significant emissions reductions, it may also
have impeded potentially more effective attempts to promote investment in low-carbon technol-
ogies at more local levels (Rayner, 2010; Victor, 2011). They argue that political momentum
towards a more global-scale approach is more likely to be generated by demonstrating clear econ-
omic and social benefits from mitigating in a specific number of problem areas. Therefore (and in
common with advocates of Option 2), they favour rapid action on powerful short-lived forcers
(Kopp & Mauzerall, 2010), the benefits of which will be more quickly apparent, as well as increased
levels of investment in research and development, rather thanwaiting for a perfectly comprehensive
global deal thatmaynever appear. This view is associatedwith scepticism towards certain other kinds
of universalistic thinking (Ostrom, 2010), including the UNFCCC’s concept of dangerous anthropo-
genic interference. Pielke (2011), for example, calls for a new international convention that does not
refer to ‘dangerous interference’ at all, but instead to the achievement of decarbonization consistent
with meeting long-term targets for the stabilization of atmospheric concentrations.
. Option 4: ‘recommit to staying within 2 8C’. The growing probability of highly risky rates of warming
makes it even more important to recommit to ‘low stabilisation targets’ (Knopf, Luderer, & Edenho-
fer, 2011, p. 617).
While accepting that it is, to some extent, a crude translation of the principle of avoiding danger-
ous climate change, advocates of Option 4 generally argue that the 2 8C target nonetheless provides a
critical role in the international regime (Hare, Stockwell, Flachsland, & Oberthu¨r, 2010; Jaeger &
Jaeger, 2011). In view of the many uncertainties associated with climate change (and in the event
that emissions are not reduced fast enough to remain within 2 8C, or climate sensitivity turns out
to be at the higher end of scientific estimates), advocates of this option argue that it is preferable
to recommit to the 2 8C target rather than abandon it. In which case, it may be sensible to actively
remove CO2 from the atmosphere now, e.g. by producing biochar or deploying bioenergy equipped
with carbon capture and storage (CCS), although the political and technical feasibility of such strat-
egies remains highly uncertain, particularly at the scale and within the timeframe necessary.
However, in order to maximize the probability of staying within 2 8C, even more radical measures
might be deemed necessary (Anderson & Bows, 2008, 2011; Swart & Marinova, 2010). To deliver
drastic emission reductions of the order of 9–10% per year, some proponents are willing to contem-
plate limits to economic growth in the short term, particularly in the industrialized world (Jackson,
2009). Of course, much depends on precisely what probability of remaining within 2 8C is sought.
This is no idle matter: the higher the probability of staying within 2 8C sought, the lower the
‘budget’ of cumulative emissions available for policy makers to consider and hence the more
radical the policy options will have to be. Be that as it may, for advocates of this option an increasing
probability that the 2 8C target will be exceeded is no reason to abandon it entirely, just as a common
756 Jordan et al.
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tendency among some drivers to exceed a given speed limit is no argument against having and enfor-
cing speed limits.
These four options are briefly summarized in Table 1. Each reflects a distinct line of argument (or
framing) of the climate governance task in the existing literature, although there are some notable
overlaps between them.When brought together and compared for the first time, it is evenmore appar-
ent that they actually embody very different images or styles of governance (Hood, 1998), and hence
different interpretations of the meaning and function of ‘2 8C’. In general, those to the left in Table 1
tend to regard it as a target that should be achieved (its role therefore being to steer social processes),
while those to the right see its role in a more flexible light, focusing instead on nearer-term political
and policy challenges, with the extent of warming left more ‘open’ (although the decision about
whether and how far to adapt in the future could be considered to be correspondingly more ‘closed’).
In a great deal of the debate about 2 8C thus far, these underlying assumptions – whether it is a target, a
focal point, or a boundary object (as well as related assumptions about the role of policy and governance
therein) – have remained rather implicit and, in some contributions, entirely absent. In fact, all four
options raise opportunities and risks for particular actors and institutions, as well as for collective efforts
to address climate change through systems of policy and governance. It is on this basis that the options
can and – this paper argues – should be cross-compared, a task that is addressed in the next section.
3. The opportunities and risks of different options
3.1 Mitigate for 2 8C but adapt for 4 8C
Advocates argue that adopting Option 1 provides the opportunity to open up new ways of addressing
climate change that do not rigidly separate mitigation from adaptation (Biesbroek, Swart, & van der
Knaap, 2009). Adopting a twin target could help to reap synergies and lessen conflicts, especially in
relation to the water–energy–food nexus (Rosenzweig & Tubiello, 2007; Secretariat of the Convention
on Biological Diversity, 2009; Swart & Raes, 2007), possibly opening up additional investment in both
mitigation and adaptation actions at the national level (Mabey et al., 2011). As the responsibility for
leading on mitigation and adaptation may rest with different policy makers, advocates suggest that
there need not necessarily be a trade-off between pursuing both to the maximum (Klein et al.,
2007). More analysis and public debate on the uncertainties embedded in and possible impacts associ-
ated with all scenarios (Shaw, 2013), and especially those at the high end (of which there are relatively
few at present; see Figure 1), could be a second big opportunity associated with Option 1 (Mabey et al.,
2011). Conceivably, this could even lead to a greater societal effort in terms of mitigation to avoid the
predicted costs.
There is, however, a significant risk that the opposite could occur. The 2 8C target has arguably sent a
signal to investors, albeit a relatively weak one, that policy makers do recognize the fundamental
importance of limiting warming. Explicit acknowledgement that it may not be reached risks under-
mining decarbonization efforts, in just the way those placing a ‘taboo’ (Pielke, Prins, Rayner, & Sare-
witz, 2007) on discussions of adaptation originally feared. In fact, accepting that the target might
not bemet couldmean thatmuch higher numbers will soon be considered and possibly even accepted
by policy makers and publics. This concern has recently been expressed by the International Energy
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Table 1 ‘Going beyond’ the status quo: four options
Options
4. ‘Recommit to staying within
2 8C’
1. ‘Mitigate for 2 8C but adapt for
4 8C’
2. ‘Adopt new metrics and
targets’
3. ‘Be politically more
pragmatic’
Headline message Urgent need for stringent
mitigation requires a single
‘meta’ target to trigger social
action
Dangerous change is likely;
policy makers should place
more emphasis on adaptation
action
Global average warming is not
the only kind of climate change
that is dangerous
The 2 8C target lacks the
political capacity to motivate
societal change
Implications for
policy and
governance
The effects of exceeding 2 8C
are serious enough to justify
the short-term costs of action
For some, this implies a
fundamental questioning of
current development paths
Mitigation and adaptation must
be considered in all policy
responses
Worst-case mitigation scenarios
should be considered when
framing adaptation responses
Move away from focusing on
mean global temperature, to
specific/ near-term targets
Deal with radiative-forcing
agents one at a time e.g. via
regional treaties
Focus on what is politically
feasible now, e.g. (1) energy
security for all; (2) viable
environments protected from
various forcings; and (3) ensure
adaptation to climate risk
Illustrative
opportunities and
risks
Opportunity: emissions in
different locations can be
related to a common focal
point
Opportunity: opens up a
debate about different forms of
‘prosperity’
Risk: a failure to remain within
2 8C causes maladaptation,
social and environmental costs
Opportunity/risk: opens up
prospect that climate
engineering will be called
upon
Opportunity: more attention
given to synergies
Opportunity: more discussion of
how to avoid worst-case
scenarios becomes possible
Risk: undermines
decarbonization efforts and/or
generates ‘adaptive emissions’
Risk: limits of adaptation
overlooked
Risk: liability and compensation
issues become more acute
Opportunity: opening up
discussions across multiple
venues overcomes deadlock in
the UNFCCC
Risk: a more differentiated
understanding of state interests
blocks progress on negotiations
Opportunity/risk: climate-
engineering options have
more ‘fit’
Opportunity: opens new political
‘entry points’ for mitigation
Risk: elevating political feasibility
as a key criterion of decision-
making risks exacerbating
technological lock-ins
Risk: action is insufficient to
prevent dangerous
temperature rise
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Agency (IEA, 2013, p. 9), when it underlined the importance of ensuring that ‘our capacity to evaluate
and quantify these impacts (from higher emissions) does not inadvertently lead to acceptance of a 4 8C
scenario’. However, as noted above, a fuller analysis of what an increase of 3 8C or 4 8C bymid-century
might really entail could reinforcemitigation efforts if the implications of going beyond 2 8C are better
understood. Certainly, it is by no means clear that the public really understands what is at stake i.e.
whether a world at 4 8C is able to support society as we currently know it.
This is not the only risk inherent inOption 1. There are several others, some ofwhich are sharedwith
Option 3. So, for all the reassurance that adaptation andmitigation actions can be complementary, the
risk of trade-offs nonetheless remains (Pittock, 2011). Under a worst-case scenario, desalinating and
transporting water (over long distances) could represent a high proportion of some countries’
energy consumption, making significant mitigation considerably harder to achieve (CEC, 2009).
More fundamental than the well-known issue of ‘adaptive emissions’, Option 1 also risks under-appre-
ciating the barriers, limits, and uncertainties associated with adaptation (Adger & Barnett, 2009; Hall,
Brown, Nicholls, Pidgeon, & Watson, 2012). Some of these relate to fundamental uncertainties in the
physical science, where greater uncertainty regarding global temperature change (Meehl et al., 2007)
implies even greater uncertainty in terms of regional impacts (Dessai, Hulme, Lempert, & Pielke,
2009). Many climate impacts scale nonlinearly with temperature, yet this is precisely the information
that will be needed to pinpoint the key sensitivities (and thus ensure that sector-specific adaptive
responses are resilient) in a 4 8C world. So, although one estimate puts the annual cost of adapting
to a 2 8C rise at a minimum of US$70 billion by 2020 and up to $100 billion by 2050 (World Bank,
2010), it cannot be assumed that adapting to a rise of 4 8C will entail costs of US$140–200 billion.
Other barriers are likely to be of a more social and political nature. Above a certain level, adaptation
maybe unable to keep pacewith the rate of change, or, as Tony deBrum seemed to be arguing,may only
be possible at unacceptable social and environmental costs. Such a threshold could even occur at 2 8C
or less in some systems, sectors, or locations. In other words, trade-offs and synergies in relation to
adaptation are highly space- and time-specific, and thus harder to pinpoint and address than this
option implies (Adger & Barnett, 2009). Question marks also hang over the extent to which public
engagement and collective effort can be galvanized in relation to this option, and indeed also in
relation to Option 3 (Shaw, 2013).
Finally, any perceived loosening of the 2 8C target risks acknowledging the need for increased finan-
cial transfers in a warmer world, thus formalizing issues of liability and compensation that developed
countries have always sought to keep off the international agenda, but which resurfaced at the Doha
COP (specifically in relation to the concept of ‘loss and damage’). Vulnerable regions and sectors
might then demand increased resources to cope with the predicted impacts, raising the fraught issue
of adaptation burden-sharing (Rayner & Jordan, 2012). This may make the politics of enhanced miti-
gation appear comparatively simpler than at present, and further complicate international
negotiations.
3.2 Adopt new metrics and targets
The first and potentially main opportunity offered by Option 2 is that by facilitating amoremultilevel
and multifaceted approach, with decisions made in multiple venues, it could unblock international
climate discussions (Victor, House, & Joy, 2005). Negotiations on particular radiative-forcing agents
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could, for example, occur in separate policy venues, i.e. regional treaties for agents with regional effects
(Lenton, 2011a, 2011b). Such a concern for radiative forcing could then serve to highlight the impor-
tance of venues and decisions that are of great significance, but have not been accorded great status in
the current climate regime. For example, it has been estimated that the 2008 decision of the Inter-
national Maritime Organization (IMO) to limit ships’ sulphur emissions, whatever its health benefits,
could have an effect on radiative forcing equivalent to a doubling of the rate of global warming
(Isoma¨ki & Pettay, 2011). In turn, a shift to more venues could open up new opportunities to build
on what has arguably been the most successful aspect of the UNFCCC – its ‘clearing house’ functions
in relation to collecting and exchanging information (Yamin & Depledge, 2004). Second, being con-
cerned with radiative forcing, rather than emissions, could create opportunities for those seeking to
alter the incoming solar radiation (geoengineering), to prevent ‘tipping elements’ (Irvine, Lunt,
Stone, & Ridgwell, 2009; MacCracken, 2006) from crossing thresholds (Caldeira & Wood, 2008).
Finally (and as with Option 1), a more differentiated approach need not be at the expense of
binding long-term global targets to limit GHG emissions; they could complement one another.
Risks, however, could be generated by adopting this option, from local to international scales. For
example, negotiating on multiple issues across multiple venues could prove to be bureaucratically
cumbersome to coordinate, especially if there is no overall objective (e.g. 2 8C) in sight. Some
authors (e.g. Mabey et al., 2011) have worked on the assumption that states achieving amore differen-
tiated understanding of the climate risks they face, informed by a range of metrics, will enable more
constructive engagement in international negotiations, while others have suggested that it risks gen-
erating greater division among the main negotiating blocs (Revkin, 2011). Another risk is that metrics
such as rates of change and tipping points fail to resonate any better with publics than2 8C (Shaw, 2013;
Whitmarsh, Seyfang, & O’Neill, 2011). At present, it is difficult to communicate climate-related risks,
which are often ‘psychologically distant’ (Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011). Focusing on more local and
near-term risks and (particularly) opportunities may be more productive, increasing individuals’
sense of efficacy andmotivation to act (Gifford et al., 2009; O’Neill &Nicholson-Cole, 2009).Widening
them to include more socially meaningful measures, such as improved well-being, could be especially
efficacious. Concerning the opportunities for advocates of geoengineering, the technical feasibility of
even themost heavily studiedmethods of intervention is a longway frombeing established.Moreover,
identifyingwhen a tipping point is due to be reached,when any counter-measures should be deployed,
and who would bear the costs are all highly uncertain and politically risky.
3.3 Be politically more pragmatic
Advocates ofOption 3 suggest that it would ensure that the benefits frommitigation for the low-carbon
economy continue to be pursued, even if the international regime embodying the 2 8C target crumbles
(Geden, 2012). In this sense, its primary opportunity is, arguably, to head off that risk. Indeed, the
adoption of multiple objectives for the energy system – e.g. covering access, security, and health
(IEA, 2012) – could provide new opportunities (or political ‘entry points’) for mitigation (McCollum,
Krey, & Riahi, 2011). Focusing on the long-term goal of decarbonization – perhaps indirectly as a sec-
ondary consequence of energy innovation – is presented as an easier ‘sell’ for politicians than tackling
‘climate change’, an agenda often associated with perceived sacrifice and guilt (Morton, Rabinovich,
Marshall, & Bretschneider, 2011). As withOption 2, reframing climate policy could open up promising
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opportunities to engage those who are particularly sceptical of the science of climate change (Bain,
Hornsey, Bongiorno, & Jeffries, 2012; Nye, Whitmarsh, & Foxon, 2010). Advocates of Option 3
further claim that once attempts to define ‘dangerous’ levels of climate change have been dropped,
adaptation can be pursued more concertedly, ‘untethered’ from mitigation (Pielke, 2011). The
‘predict then act’ approach was in any case always simplistic. Instead, adaptation could respond to
interlinked vulnerabilities arising from a host of climate and ‘non’ climate drivers (Dessai et al., 2009).
Themost obvious risk associated with this option (and also Option 2) is that a less centrally–steered
approach fails to generate the sense of commonpurpose andurgency deemednecessary to significantly
mitigate emissions, possibly undermining emerging carbon markets and creating a ‘demobilising
climate of pessimism’ (Guivarch&Hallegatte, 2013, p. 189). It also risks jeopardizing the development
of large-scale international fundingmechanisms formitigation and adaptation activities in developing
countries (Donner, Kandlikar, & Zerriffi, 2011). The concerns expressed above regarding Option 1 –
that it risks impacts developing that go beyond societal capacity to adapt – apply equally if not
more so toOption 3.While advocates of Option 3 recognize the need for greater North–South resource
transfers to address adaptation as a ‘development challenge’, the precise mechanisms through which
this would occur are by nomeans explained (Prins et al., 2010). Finally, making political pragmatism a
key criterion of decision making risks exacerbating the institutional and technological lock-in of
current energy-related infrastructure (Unruh, 2002). Promotion of shale gas fracking offers a pertinent
present-day illustration of a technology that may facilitate short-term emission reductions, but may
not deliver longer-term decarbonization (Broderick & Anderson, 2012).
3.4 Recommit to staying within 2 8C
Finally, policy makers have the option of recommitting to stay within 2 8C, or even moving the target
to 1.5 8C. As noted above, the current commitment to 2 8C offers international negotiators an impor-
tant focal point that, at least in principle, has some political traction and legal force. Because success is
measured globally, it provides an opportunity to identify free-riders and, in theory, sanction them.
Deciding at the end of the 2013–2015 review to recommit to staying within the target could allow
that benefit to continue. However, as noted above, the policy and governance implications of doing
so would need to be taken more seriously than they have been to date, otherwise it risks being little
more than a symbolic exercise. These implications (and thus political stakes) would be much clearer
if the review was more explicit about identifying a probability range for exceeding 2 8C.
The point about analyses that suggest that 2 8C is no longer attainable is that they tend to take
present-day assumptions about economic growth for granted. Some, such as Lord Stern, have stressed
that staying within 2 8C is the ‘pro-growth strategy’, while others, including at times Stern himself (see
Watts, 2009), see the necessity for amuchmore radical reframing in the face of immutable limits (Hoff-
mann, 2011). Although any kind of degrowth agenda faces undeniable political feasibility constraints,
advocates also stress the opportunities to develop better quality, ‘post-consumerist’ lifestyles (Barry,
2012). Finally, although widely associated with a radical emission reduction agenda, of the four
options, Option 4 could conceivably also offer the greatest opportunities to thosewho advocate geoen-
gineering as the least socially disruptive way (i.e. not requiring radical lifestyle change) to adjust the
global ‘thermostat’. As with Option 2, however, this would raise its own deeply challenging political
and ethical questions (Barrett, 2010).
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One of the main risks posed by Option 4 is that, in a (futile) attempt to stay within 2 8C, irreversible
sacrifices are made across a range of environmental and social values. For example, biodiversity might
be sacrificed to grow more biomass (often a key plank of low-emission scenarios), leading to it being
caught in a double bind of impacts from climate change and the similarly destructive effects of mitiga-
tion, or even worse impacts from poorly understood geoengineering interventions (Secretariat of the
Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009). The ‘brutal arithmetic’4 required to reduce emissions suffi-
cientlymay require that both per capita incomegrowth in developed countries and prospects for devel-
opment gains in the global South diminish, potentially cementing gross injustices (Hoffmann, 2011).
Recommitting to stayingwithin the existing target also risks delivering insufficient adaptation if policy
makers refuse to acknowledge that it may not be reached, putting vulnerable regions and populations
in even graver danger. Furthermore, as with Option 3, concerns aboutmaladaptation could be realized
if societies invest in activities that prove costly if a 4 8C world materializes.
These risks and opportunities, however politically difficult, would be a lot clearer if all the options,
includingOption 4,were explored in the context of awider debate aboutwhat probability of remaining
within 2 8C should be targeted. If the declared aimwas to seek a high probability of remaining within 2
8C, some of the debates about the risks and opportunities of degrowth would be more pertinent. If, on
the other hand, decision makers were only to seek a 20% or 30% chance of staying within 2 8C, the
growth issue would not be nearly as problematic.
4. ‘Going beyond’ the 2 8C target?
More is being learnt about the probability and also the implications of ‘going beyond’ 2 8C, although
huge uncertainties remain with respect to both these issues. Both should form an important part of the
2013–2015 review, butwhether or not they do remains to be seen. Formally, the review should consider
the following (UNFCCC, 2010, para. 139(a)):
1. The best available scientific knowledge, including the assessment reports of the IPCC
2. The observed impacts of climate change
3. An assessment of the overall aggregated effect of the steps taken by Parties in order to achieve the
ultimate objective of the Convention
4. Consideration of strengthening the long-term global goal, referencing variousmatters presented by
the science, including those in relation to temperature rises of 1.5 8C
However, many countries will not want to open up the debate around the fourth point too much,
and some will likely try to restrict it to nomore than issue 3, i.e. a report on what pledges and emission
reductions have been made thus far in relation to the existing target of 2 8C.
We argue that narrowing the scope of the review too much would be an important opportunity
missed. When confronted with such a deep policy dilemma, policy makers should be as aware as poss-
ible of all the implications of pursuing alternative courses of action. In situations of high uncertainty
and strong and enduring value differences, scholars of policy appraisal recommend ‘opening’ up policy
dilemmas to wider framings and sources of expertise, rather than ‘closing them down’ in a valiant
attempt to arrive at a scientifically precise answer regardless of whether it has societal support
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(Stirling, 2008, p. 262). We suggest that the international climate regime itself faces such a high risk,
posed by a growing realization that 2 8C is very probably unattainable, at least with current policy
responses and current understandings of climate sensitivity (the latter issue becoming the subject of
increased debate in 2013 – see for example Otto et al., 2013). For this reason, we recommend that
the 2013–2015 review examine a range of alternative options. By examining (and challenging)
some of these alternatives to the status quo, a wider societal debate about the ultimate objectives of
climate policy could be stimulated.
As noted above, the 2013–2015 review is specifically directed to consider ‘various matters presented
by the science’. This paper has initiated an exploration of some of the policy and governance implications
of adopting four very different approaches, drawing upon science and social science perspectives.
Often, these implications have been only superficially considered in debates about 2 8C, yet history
suggests these policy and governance implications are precisely the issues on which agreement at
the international level has foundered. Bringing the options together proved to be very illuminating.
It was shown, for example, that similar opportunities and risks apply to more than one option. This
is important, because it suggests that no single option – including Option 4 – is uniformly ‘better’
than the rest. Indeed, future research could usefully explore the scope for combining elements of differ-
ent options, as part of amore systematic comparison than space allows here, but which this journal has
a record of publishing (see, e.g. Aldy et al., 2003). It has been shown that Options 2 and 4 are to some
extent compatible with one another, as are Options 1 and 3.
Our key point, however, is that, as uncomfortable and threatening as it may be to sketch out and
explore the risks, opportunities and uncertainties associated with alternative options, it could offer a
more productive and in the longer term more politically sustainable way to grapple with the deep
dilemma at the heart of contemporary climate policy. In fact, and perhaps rather ironically, it may
encourage some of the more doubtful decision makers to (re-) commit to the existing 2 8C target,
however demanding it may be, as the least unattractive course of action.
Nonetheless, introducing and appraising different options will serve at best to clarify, not remove,
the underlying policy dilemma. Important questions would remain, e.g. concerning who would adju-
dicate on these matters, when decisions would need to be made, and whether sufficient agreement
would be possible on key issues such as what probability of staying within 2 8C or 1.5 8C to aim for.
According to decisions made at Cancun, the COP ‘shall take appropriate action based on the [2013–
2015] review’ (UNFCCC, 2010, para. 139(c), emphasis added). What ‘appropriate action’ might
involve in practice was not clarified at Doha, although it is expected to inform the negotiations of
the Durban Platform. With respect to timing, would a decision either to reaffirm or replace the 2 8C
target need to be made at the end of the review in 2015 or when the envisaged global deal is reached
in that year? Or could it wait until 2020 when the UN hopes a successor to Kyoto will be operational?
If the target were to be reaffirmed, what probability of its achievement would be required? The time
that an appraisal exercise – or possibly even exercises5 – would absorb, will of course have hugely
important implications for the likelihood of limiting warming to 2 8C (Figure 1) and thus the basis
on which other options are considered.
For now, the ironic prospect arises that the 2013–2015 review, initially called for as a route to tigh-
tening the 2 8C target, could conceivably conclude that it has, in effect, become unreachable. Then
what? Institutional theory (March & Olsen, 1984; Pierson, 2004) suggests that, once adopted, targets
and their associated policies attract political supporterswho resist change (Young, 2010), and especially
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attempts to dismantle them (Jordan, Bauer, & Green-Pedersen, 2013). This may apply in particular to
perhaps the target’s strongest supporter, the EU, where a danger may be perceived that member states
would seize an opportunity to reopen contentious ‘effort-sharing’ arrangements to jockey for more
favourable terms (Rayner & Jordan, 2012). Its supporters may therefore continue to support the 2 8C
target as something that serves to bring together diverse interests, even though in practice it appears
less and less achievable. This being the case, a ‘non-decision’ about 2 8C in 2015 remains a very
likely but, for the reasons outlined above, politically risky prospect.
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